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Good Policy or Judicial Abdication:
When Courts Uphold Arbitral
Awards Which are in Excess of the
Arbitrator's Jurisdiction
Hall v. Superior Court'

I. INTRODUCTION
Legislatures and the court system have advanced a strong policy to encourage
individuals to arbitrate disputes and avoid the traditional judicial system. 2 In
order to promote this policy, it is vital that arbitrators' awards be respected and
upheld if at all possible. Consequently, the grounds for review of arbitration
awards are limited.' One of the grounds available for vacating an arbitral
decision arises when an arbitrator exceeds his or her jurisdiction by purporting to
decide issues not submitted by the parties for arbitral determination. 4 This Note
discusses the potential consequences to the overall policy goals of encouraging
arbitration when reviewing courts fail to vacate arbitration awards which purport
to decide issues outside of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.

II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG
Jan and Martha Hall hired the real estate brokerage firm of Burgess Colon
Robinson and Co., Inc. [hereinafter BCRC] to list their home for sale.5 Steven
Trompas, a commercial broker for the firm and the Halls' neighbor, solicited the
listing and shared the sales commission with Tom Proell.6 Proell was the listing
agent in the BCRC office and the sole signator on the listing agreement with the
Halls.7 Trompas and Proell both held open houses and showed the property to
prospective buyers.'
Trompas was also involved in several telephone
conversations with the various parties and monitored the transaction once the offer

1. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
2. See. e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
3. Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Assocs., 265 Cal. Rptr. 868, 872 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
4. HaI, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
5. Id at 377.
6. Id
7. Id at 378.
8. Id
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came in.9 The joint efforts of Trompas and Proell eventually produced a buyer
who purchased the property, but later defaulted. 0
When the purchaser defaulted, the Halls, seeking damages, filed a complaint
against Proell, Trompas, and BCRC alleging that the three defendants withheld
information regarding the financial problems of the buyers." The complaint
alleged that Proell and Trompas acted as agents for one another, but it did not
specifically allege that a partnership existed between the two. 2
Proell, Trompas, and BCRC 3 denied the allegations and each invoked the
arbitration clause of the listing agreement in their answer.' 4 The parties
eventually agreed to submit all issues to arbitration.'" Pursuant to this agreement,
the superior6 court submitted the matter to arbitrator Stuart Safine for binding
arbitration.1
Trompas appeared at the arbitration hearing in propriapersona.'7 He was
advised by the arbitrator that one issue for determination was whether Trompas
was a co-agent and partner of Proell based on his involvement in the transaction
and his sharing of the commission with Proell.' The arbitrator explained that
Trompas could be held vicariously liable for Proell's conduct if an agency or
partnership relationship was found to exist.'9
At the close of the case, the arbitrator granted a request by Trompas to have
an attorney file a closing brief on his behalf.20 Subsequently, the attorney
requested an extension of time to file the brief and moved to reopen the hearing
to allow evidence on the partnership issue.2' The arbitrator granted the
extension, but denied the request to reopen.22

9. Id.
10.
Id. at 377. The purchasers defaulted due to financial difficulties.
Id.
11.
12.
Id During discovery, the Halls' attorney explained to Trompas' attorney that the Halls'
theory was that Trompas was vicariously liable for Proell's omissions. The Halls' attorney also
explained to Trompas that the Halls considered him a co-agent and partner of Proell, and thus,
responsible for Proell's actions. However, no cause of action based on partnership was alleged in the
complaint. Id.
13. BCRC filed for bankruptcy before the arbitrator's award and the matter was stayed against
it. Id at 378.
14. Id. at 377. The arbitration clause covered "(a)ny dispute or claim in law or equity arising
Id. at 381.
out of this contract or any resulting transaction ....
15. Id at 378.
16. Id
17. Id The definition of in propriapersonais "in one's own proper person." It was formerly
a rule in pleading wherein pleas as to the jurisdiction of the court had to be plead inpropria persona,
because if pleaded by an attorney, jurisdiction was admitted. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th ed.
1990).
18. Hall, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378.
19. Id In his declaration to the California Court of Appeals, Trompas stated that he believed
the issue was whether he had engaged in any wrongful conduct. Id at 377-78.
20. Id at 378.
21.
Id
22. Id

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss1/15

2

Schulte: Schulte: Good Policy or Judicial Abdication:
Arbitrator'sJurisdiction

19941

The arbitrator awarded the Halls $139,488.87 in damages against Proell and
Trompas. 3 In making this award, the arbitrator identified several acts of
misconduct by Proell, and found, as a matter of law, that Trompas was liable as
a partner of24Proell due to his joint participation in marketing the home and sharing
the profits.

Subsequently, the Halls sought to confirm the award, while Trompas sought
it.' The superior court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his
vacate
to
jurisdiction by deciding the partnership issue which had not been raised in the
pleadings, and as a result, vacated the award as to Trompas. 26 In addition, the
superior court found that the arbitrator had erred by refusing to allow presentation
of evidence on the partnership issue. In reaching its decision, the superior court
relied on the proposition in Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown &

Associates" that when an arbitrator acts in excess of his or her jurisdiction by
attempting to determine matters not submitted for arbitration, the award should be
vacated. 29 Thus, the superior court held that the actions of the arbitrator violated
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 1286.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
which details the grounds for vacating the arbitrator's award. 0 The Halls
petitioned the California Court of Appeals for the First District to issue a writ of
mandate to the superior court to confirm the arbitrator's award."
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held that the superior court
overstepped its authority in vacating the arbitrator's award as being in excess of
his jurisdiction, and as a result, issued the writ ordering the superior court to set

23.

Id. Proell then filed for bankruptcy. Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id

26.
27.

Id
Id.

265 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). For a criticism of Cobler, see Kevin L
28.
Wibbenmeyer, Note, Curtailing the Arbitrator's Power: Valid Withholding ofJurisdiction orJudicial
F/aw? 1991 J. DISP. RESOL 183.

29.

Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875.

30.

CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982). This section provides that the court shall

vacate an award on any of five grounds:
a. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;

b. There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
c. The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral
arbitrator
d. The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without
affecting the merits of he decision upon the controversy submitted, or
e. The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of
the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the
arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
Id. § 1286.2.
31. Hail, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378.
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aside its 32order vacating the award, thereby confirming the award of the
arbitrator.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The California Legislature [hereinafter Legislature] has expressed a strong
public policy in favor of arbitration through the enactment of a comprehensive
statutory scheme which regulates private arbitration.33 As a result, California
courts are determined to give effect to arbitration proceedings.34 The policy
behind providing statutory enforcement of arbitration proceedings is to encourage
people who wish to avoid the time and expense of traditional civil actions to
choose their own forum for settlements of disputes.35
By agreeing that an arbitral decision be final, parties evince their intent to
bypass the judicial system and avoid the potential costs and delays at the trial and
appellate levels. 36 By ensuring that the arbitrator's decision is final, courts assure
that the parties receive the benefit of their bargain.37 These reasons, in part,
supply the rationale for the general rule that an arbitrator's decision is, with
limited exceptions, unreviewable on its merits.38
Generally, arbitrators "may base their decisions on broad principles ofjustice
39
'
Further, the merits of the controversy are not subject to judicial
equity.
and
0
4
is
not appropriate for a court to review the sufficiency of the
"It
review.
arbitrator or to pass upon the validity of the arbitrator's
the
before
evidence
4
reasoning." " Thus, the arbitrator's decision cannot usually be reviewed for
errors of fact or law.42
The risk that an arbitrator may make a mistake as to fact or law is deemed
to be acceptableby the parties who have agreed to bear that risk in exchange for
a quick, inexpensive, and final resolution of their grievance.4 3 However, the
aforementioned risk of mistake is reduced by legislative enactment of procedures

32.

Id at 381, 383.

The Court of Appeals also held that Trompas was not substantially

prejudiced by the arbitrator's refusal to reopen the hearing to hear evidence on the partnership issue.
Id at 383.
33. CAL CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 1280-1288 (West 1982).
34.

Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 902.

35.
36.

Id at 903.
Id.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
1985).
42.
43.

Id.
d. at 904.
Id.
Id.; Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 213 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68 (Cal. Ct App.
Id.
Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904.
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for judicial review when there is a serious44problem with either the arbitral award
or the fairness of the arbitration process.
In furtherance of the goal of encouraging arbitration, and to give binding
effect to the proceedings, the Legislature has limited judicial review of arbitration
awards to those grounds specified by statute.45 Section 1286.2 of the Code of
46
Civil Procedure specifies five grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award.
Prior to 1992, California courts had extended judicial review of arbitration
awards to include situations where an error of law appearing on the face of an
award caused substantial injustice.47 However, the California Supreme Court in
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase rejected that ground, stating that "[tlhose decisions
permitting review of an award where an error of law appears on the face of the
award causing substantial injustice have perpetuated a point of view that is
48
inconsistent with the modern view of arbitration and are therefore disapproved."
Thus, after Moncharsh, arbitration awards containing errors on the face of the
record are no longer reviewable, regardless of whether they cause substantial
injustice.49 Moncharsh also held that arbitrators do not exceed their authority
when they make errors of fact or law.5 0
Arbitrators derive their authority solely from the agreement or the stipulation
of submission to arbitration. 5' Since arbitrators derive their power from the
arbitration agreement, they have no power to decide issues which have not been
submitted for resolution."5 However, an arbitrator is authorized to determine all
questions necessary to resolve the controversy. 3 In addition, it is the arbitrator's
function to interpret the petitioner's complaint, or the stipulation of submission by
5
the parties, to determine which issues have been submitted for resolution.
Stipulations to arbitrate are broadly construed in order to quickly and economically
settle disputes between parties."
Once the issues are determined, it is the arbitrator's duty to keep the
proceedings confined to the issues submitted, even if the parties attempt to
introduce evidence outside of those issues.56 When an arbitration award purports

44.

Id at 905.

45. CAL Civ. POc. CODE § 1286.2(a)-(e) (West 1982).
46. See supra note 30.
47. See generally Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr. 868; Ray Wilson, 213 Cal. Rptr. 62; Delta Lines, Inc.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 136 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
48. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 916. For a criticism of Moncharsh,see Michael J. Smith, Note,
Efficient Injustice: The Demise of the "SubstantialInjustice" Erception to Arbitral Finality, 1993 J.
DISP. RESOL 209.
49. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 916.
50. Id
51.
Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875; Delta Lines, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
52. Ray Wilson, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
53. Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (Cal. CL App. 1970).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr, at 876.
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to decide unsubmitted issues, the award is to be vacated as being in excess of the
arbitrator's jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 1286.2(d).57 However,

when an arbitrator has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, the reviewing court may
uphold that part of the award that is valid, while vacating that part which is
outside of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to determine. 5
The policy behind restricting the arbitrator to determining issues submitted
by the parties is that arbitrators gain their power from the contract; therefore, they
must give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties to the
arbitration agreement."9 There is no policy requiring individuals to accept
arbitration of issues to which they have not agreed to arbitrate.6" Hence, to give
effect to an award that was in excess of the arbitrator's jurisdiction would be
contrary to the policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes by the voluntary
agreement of the parties.61 As a result, the California Legislature has ensured
that the contractual intentions of the parties are satisfied by providing judicial
review of arbitration awards in the event that an arbitrator exceeds the jurisdiction
authorized by the agreement or stipulation of submission entered into by the
parties."
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

The California Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating that the superior
court's reliance on Cobler was erroneous for several reasons.63 First, the court
asserted that Cobler was decided before Moncharsh," and further, the Cobler
court had relied heavily on Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital

Ass'n,65 a decision that Moncharsh had rejected.66 The court also explained that
the Cobler court had devoted attention to the legal question of whether
professional negligence principles could be used to support an award against a
career consulting business, an area that Moncharsh has since foreclosed.67

57. Delta Lines, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 349. Section 1286.2(d) provides for vacation of an arbitral
award if the arbitrator exceeds his or her powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting
the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(d) (West
1982).
58. Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
59. DeltaLines, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
60. Id. at 349.
61. Cobler,265 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (quoting William B. Logan & Assocs. v. Monogram Precision
Indus., 7 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. CL. App. 1960)).
62. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(d) (West 1982).
63. Hall, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380.
64. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
65. 213 Cal. Rptr. 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
66. Hall, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380.
67. Id.
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Second, the court stated that even if Cobler is not inconsistent with
Moncharsh, it is distinguishable because the arbitration clause in Cobler covered
only disputes "arising from" the agreement, whereas the arbitration clause in the
instant case encompasses "any dispute or claim in law or equity arising out of the
contract or any resulting transaction. "' Third, and more significantly, Coblerdid
not address the central question in this case: whether the Halls' civil complaint,
not the arbitration clause or stipulation of submission by the parties, defines the
scope of arbitration.69 The court explained that there was no civil complaint in
Cobler, and that the Cobler court looked first to the arbitration clause, and then
to the demand and cross-demand for arbitration, to determine the scope of the
arbitration. 0

Citing Delta Lines, Inc. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,71 the

Hall court argued that arbitrators derive their power solely from the arbitration
agreement, and that they cannot exceed those powers.72 The court stated that
neither Delta,nor any other decision, supports the view that a civil complaint filed
before invocation of an arbitration clause limits the scope of arbitration. 3
Furthermore, the court explained that even though Trompas did not sign the
BCRC, he was entitled to its benefits, and
arbitration agreement as an agent of
14
thus, subject to its burdens as well.
After completing this analysis, the court stated that it could not determine
from the record presented whether the parties had stipulated to arbitrate "any
dispute or claim in law or equity arising out of the contract or any resulting
transaction," as the arbitration agreement stated, or only the issues raised in the
civil complaint. 75 Taking into account that the demand for arbitration was in
response to the Halls' civil complaint, and because the same superior court judge
had sent the matter to arbitration and vacated the arbitration award, the court held
that it would accept the possibility that the parties stipulated to arbitrate only the
issues raised in the complaint.7 6
Next, the Hall court concluded that even if the parties had agreed to arbitrate
only those issues raised in the complaint, the superior court had, nevertheless,
overstepped its authority by vacating the award.77 The Hall court held that the
arbitrator had properly concluded that partnership was among the issues that the
complaint raised.78 In making this determination, the court cited Felner v.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id at 381.
Id.
Id.
136 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
Hall, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
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Meritplan Insurance Co.79 for the proposition that it is the arbitrator's role to
determine which issues are "necessary" to the ultimate decisions.8 0 The Hall
court also relied on Felnerto support its position that any doubts regarding the
meaning or extent of an arbitration agreement are for the arbitrators, not the
courts, to resolve.8' The Hall court held that since the partnership issue was
properly before the arbitrator, the only questions for the superior court to consider
were whether there had been corruption or misconduct by the arbitrator and
whether the arbitrator had improperly conducted the hearing or exceeded his

powers in making the award."'
The court found that there was no misconduct or corruption.s 3 In addition,
the court held that the arbitrator had rightfully concluded that the partnership issue
was among the items to be submitted for arbitral resolution.8 The court
explained that the arbitrator could have reached that decision in one of two
ways."5 First, he could have reached that decision by reading the agency
allegations in the complaint broadly to include partnership. 6 On the other hand,
the arbitrator could have determined that by submitting all issues in the complaint,
which incorporated the listing agreement, the parties had agreed to submit all
issues, including partnership, between them.'
Finally, the Hall court concluded that the superior court had usurped the
arbitrator's primary role by interpreting the complaint.' Accordingly, the court
held that the superior court had erred in deciding that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers within the meaning of Section 1286.2(d) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.89

V. COMMENT
A cursory reading of Hall would lead one to believe that the court was
simply promoting the strong policy of upholding arbitration awards by limiting a
reviewing court's authority to vacate awards to those grounds outlined by statute.
While the Hall court should be commended for its commitment to upholding
arbitration awards and restricting review of arbitration proceedings, the court did
so on questionable grounds.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

86 Cal. Rptr. 178 (Cal. CL App. 1970).
Hall, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
Id
Id at 381-82.
Id at382.

84.

Id

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id
Id
Id.
Id at 381.
Id at 382.
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A major part of the Hall court's holding was based on its determination that
the superior court had erroneously relied on the holding in Cobler." However,
the superior court's reliance on a proposition espoused by the Cobler court was
appropriate in this case. In its decision to vacate the arbitrator's award, the
superior court relied on the holding in Cobler that arbitrators must restrict
themselves to the issues raised by the pleadings in making awards. 9' That part
of the Cobler holding is still valid law after Moncharsh.
In Cobler, the reviewing court had overturned an arbitrator's award of
emotional distress damages, stating that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to award
them.9 In determining that the arbitrator had lacked jurisdiction to award
emotional distress damages, the reviewing court noted that the only issues decided
by the arbitrator were contract claims, and that emotional distress damages are
generally not available on contract claims.93 The reviewing court in Cobler could
only make this determination by finding that the arbitrator had made an error of
law. The Supreme Court of California in Moncharsh criticized holdings like
Cobler for creating another ground in which to vacate arbitration awards: when
an error of law appears on the face of the award and causes substantial
injustice.94 The Moncharsh court held that California courts would no longer
vacate an arbitration award on that ground.95

In Hall, the superior court did not vacate the arbitrator's award because of
an error of substantive law; the court vacated the arbitral award because the
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue.96 The analogy between
the actions of the Cobler court and the Hall court is misplaced. The Cobler court
found that the arbitrator had made an error of law by awarding emotional distress
damages in a contract dispute; since emotional distress damages are not available
in a contract dispute, the Cobler court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his
jurisdiction by awarding them. In the present case, the superior court did not
determine that the arbitrator had made an error of law in deciding that Trompas
and Proell were partners where no partnership actually existed. Instead, the
superior court ruled that the arbitrator should never have decided the partnership
issue because the partnership issue was never submitted for his determination.
These are clearly two different issues. The appellate court is correct in this sense:
if the superior court had determined that the arbitrator made an error of law in

90. Id at 380.
91. Id at 379.
92. Cobler, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
93. Id at 875. In Cobler, the demand and cross-demand for arbitration originally raised only
contract issues, and a later demand for punitive damages did not identify an alleged tort. The briefs
had raised a theory of fraud, but the arbitrator had made no findings on the fraud issue. Because
emotional distress damages generally do not arise from breach of contract, and the arbitrator did not
decide the only tort issue submitted, the Cobler court found that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to
award emotional distress damages and vacated the award. Id
94. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 916.
95. Id.
96. Hall,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379-80.
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finding that Trompas and Proell were partners, and vacated the award on that
ground, the court would have been treading in an area that Moncharsh had
foreclosed. However, the superior court made no such determination. The
superior court did not determine that the arbitrator erred in finding that a
partnership existed. Rather, it said only that the arbitrator erred in determining the
partnership issue at all.
In its second point, the Hall court stated that even if Cobler is not
inconsistent with Moncharsh, the two cases are distinguishable because the
arbitration clauses differ. However, the Hall court later determined that the civil
complaint, not the arbitration clause, controlled. In addition, while the Hall
court cited the difference between the arbitration clauses, the court never said why
the difference was significant.98
After accepting, arguendo, that the civil complaint, and not the arbitration
clause, governed the arbitration, the Hall court nevertheless concluded that the
superior court erred in determining that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction.99
The court held that the arbitrator had properly concluded that partnership was
However, the court had earlier
among the issues raised in the complaint.'
acknowledged that the complaint did not state a cause of action based on
Nonetheless, the Hall court concluded that the arbitrator could
partnership.'
have reached that determination by: 1) reading the agency allegations in the
complaint broadly to include partnership; or 2) finding that in agreeing to submit
all of the disputed issues in the complaint, which incorporated the listing
agreement, the parties impliedly agreed to submit all issues between them."°
Regardless of the court's justification, there are several problems with this
analysis. First, in concluding that the arbitrator could have read the agency
allegation broadly to include partnership, the court ignored the fact that agency
and partnership impose different liabilities upon Trompas. 3 Second, even if the
arbitrator could have determined that the parties agreed to submit all issues
between them, Trompas received no notice in the complaint, the arbitration
agreement, or the agreement of submission that he might have been liable on a
partnership theory.'0 4

Citing Felner,the Hall court held that it is the arbitrator's role to determine
which issues are actually "necessary" to the ultimate decision. 5 This argument
would be of merit if it had, in fact, been necessary for the arbitrator in this case

97. Id. at 381.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 382.
101.
Id. at377.
102. Id. at 382.
103.
See CAL PARTNERSHIP ACT, §§ 15006-15008 (West 1982).
104.
While the arbitrator inforraed Trompas that he might be liable on a partnership theory,
partnership was not put forth in the complaint, the arbitration agreement, or the stipulation of
submission by the parties.
105. Hall, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
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to determine the partnership issue in order to dispose of the controversy.
However, the partnership issue was not necessary to the ultimate decision. The
arbitrator could have disposed of the controversy by finding Proell liable for his
misconduct without attaching liability to Trompas. Instead, the arbitrator
determined as a matter of law that Trompas and Proell were partners, thus making
Trompas liable for the actions of Proell.
It is clear that California courts are committed to upholding arbitration
awards and limiting review of these awards to those grounds specified by statute.
Hall is a case in which the court could have, and arguably should have, vacated
the arbitrator's award as being in excess of his jurisdiction. In their eagerness to
give effect to and uphold arbitration awards, the Hall court reinstated an arbitral
award which should have been vacated. In doing so, the court undernined its
ultimate goal of encouraging individuals to avoid the traditional judicial system
in settling their disputes.
VI. CONCLUSION

Decisions like Hall may serve to dissuade individuals from entering into
arbitration agreements. While individuals evince their intent to bypass the judicial
system by agreeing to arbitrate disputes, they also expect that the arbitrators will
decide only those issues submitted for resolution. When arbitrators exceed their
jurisdiction by determining issues not submitted by the parties, the parties should
feel confident that the courts will intervene on their behalf. The decision reached
by the appellate court in Hall v. Superior Court not only serves to dissuade
individuals from entering into arbitration agreements out of fear that the court will
not intervene, but also forces them to accept an arbitral decision which purports
to decide issues that were never within the mutually bargained-for contract to
arbitrate.
SHARON E. SCHULTE
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